


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Will the Revolution be Funded? Resource Mobilization and the California Farm Worker Movement

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ABSTRACT *Based on archival and qualitative field research, this paper describes how the philanthropic investments of the Max L. Rosenberg Foundation contributed to the emergence of the historic California Farm Worker Movement. The author argues that foundations do not always have articulated or clear-cut political agendas to dilute organizing campaigns; instead moments of agreement (and antagonism) emerge and are fluidly negotiated as points of convergence appear and disappear. This paper reveals the three critical periods in which the Max L. Rosenberg Foundation invested in farmworker organizations in California's Central Valley: the dustbowl migrant education period of the 1930–1940s, the self-help housing projects of the 1950s, and the early leadership training campaigns of the Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s. This paper makes a significant contribution to resource mobilization theory by showing how private funding of a particular social movement (and therefore perhaps others if examined) was most aligned with the goals of the movement at the open-ended idealist beginnings. This alignment ruptured during the heat of the late 1960s when demands were made on picket lines and through international boycotts and became most problematic in the wake of significant defeats when movement organizations reshaped and professionalized themselves around foundation grants and ceased to represent their original constituents.*

KEY WORDS: Philanthropy, social movements, Farm Worker Movement, foundations, California, Central Valley

I began research on the relationship between private philanthropy and the California Farm Worker Movement pessimistic about the role of private foundations in social movements and inspired by the recent wave of post-Marxist scholarship on philanthropy and imperialism, such as *The Revolution Will Not Be Funded* (INCITE!, 2007). Through interviews with movement leaders and archival research on the movement and its investors, I was surprised to find that private foundations played a critical and even sometimes risk-taking role in preparing farmworker communities for the social movements of the 1960s. I was also surprised to find that foundation leadership inspired the founding of many advocacy organizations that today, under duress from federal budget cuts and enduring poverty in farmworker communities, continue to work tirelessly in the shadows of a historic social movement.

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This paper reveals the contributions of philanthropic investments in social movements by examining three critical periods in which one foundation in particular, the Max L. Rosenberg Foundation, invested in farmworker organizations in California's Central Valley: the dustbowl migrant education period of the 1930–1940s, the self-help housing projects of the 1950s, and the early leadership training campaigns leading up to the Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s. In this paper, I argue that while private foundations do not fund radical movement activities that threaten the structures of wealth that foundations rely upon, as argued by an emerging body of critical nonprofit scholarship (King & Osayande, 2007; Rodriguez, 2007; Roelofs, 2003), they have played a central role in building pre-movement momentum. In keeping with resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), I show how during the early stages of the California Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s, partnerships between movement leaders, foundation professionals, and regional nonprofit organizations facilitated fluid and flexible funding structures that enabled the leadership and organizational development that was central to the early success of the movement.

This paper relies on archival and qualitative data from my larger study on migrant poverty, farmworker organizing, and private philanthropy (Kohl-Arenas, 2011, *in press*). The main argument of this paper is that foundation funding in a particular social movement (and therefore perhaps others if examined) was most aligned with the goals of the social movement at the open-ended idealist beginnings. This alignment ruptured during the heat of the late 1960s when demands were made on picket lines and international boycotts, and became most problematic in the wake of significant defeats when movement organizations reshaped and professionalized themselves around foundation grants and ceased to represent their original constituents. Thus, resource mobilization was central to catalyzing the movement; yet, private foundations were ultimately unwilling to fund organizing that threatened the economic structures of industrial agriculture.

I begin this paper with a brief overview of the public attention paid to California farm labor, leading up to the moment when the crisis faced by Depression era dustbowl migrants first attracted interest from major private foundations.¹ Before describing how philanthropic investments contributed to the emergence of the Farm Worker Movement, I provide a theoretical context, based on resource mobilization theory, for understanding the relationship between philanthropy and social movements. The 'Poverty Amidst Plenty: Farm Workers in California's Central Valley' section shows how the investments of one major funder of the movement, the Max L. Rosenberg Foundation, mobilized the resources of public programs, local institutions, and grassroots leaders contributing to the critical conjuncture of organizational and human leadership that catalyzed a historic social movement.

Poverty Amidst Plenty: Farm Workers in California's Central Valley

Migrant worker families are the victims of a permanent disaster. An estimated 200,000 – no one know just how many – farm workers and their families, who work seasonally in California's cotton fields, fruit orchards and vegetable farms, have been swept up in a new disaster so vast that the eyewitness must grope back to the great depression to find anything like it. And it's here for all to see; a belt of hunger, disease and wretchedness running the 200 mile length of the West's richest valley,

the San Joaquin [...] Wherever we looked-along the great highroad itself, beside the ditch bank and sloughs a few hundred yards off the road, in the mud-sodden camps of pitched tents and in sprawling shantytowns of knocked-down trailers, lean-tos and occasional neat, adobe cottages-we stepped into thumbnail dramas of incredible misery. (Velie, 1950)

Throughout the twentieth century, sporadic attempts were made to capture public attention and inspire outrage at the poor conditions of California farm laborers. While the conditions have not changed much over the past century, each public plea seems to evoke a new or emerging tragedy. The words of the American Red Cross worker quoted earlier, interviewed for a 1950 exposé in *Collier's Magazine*, vividly illustrate the ‘permanent disaster’ that is the California farm labor system. Only this disaster did not begin or end in 1950. Today, California’s Central Valley is at once the richest agricultural region in the world and home to the poorest people living in the USA, with a higher concentration of poverty than in Appalachia or any inner city (Berube & Katz, 2005; Doyle, 2008; Great Valley Center, 1999). Farmworker poverty in California’s Central Valley is also not simply a lingering remnant of the dustbowl migration during the Great Depression, but stretches back to the Anglo settlement and purchase of California’s most fertile lands. As early as 1893, British Ambassador James Bryce called attention to the source of enduring migrant poverty:

When California was ceded to the United States (1848), land speculators bought up large tracts under Spanish titles, others foreseeing the coming prosperity, subsequently acquired great domains by purchase, either from the railways, which had received land grants, or directly from the government [...] established enormous farms, in which the soil is cultivated by hired labourers, many of whom are discharged after the harvest – a phenomenon rare in the United States, which is elsewhere a country of moderately sized farms, owned by persons who do most of their labour by their own hand and their children’s hands. Thus the land system of California presents features both peculiar and dangerous, a contract between great properties, often appearing to conflict with the general weal, and the sometimes hard pressed small farmer, together with a great mass of unsettled labour, thrown without work into the towns at a certain time of the year. (Bryce, 1893)

Since the institution of the land system described by Bryce, California farm labor has been organized around what Martin (2003) calls ‘The Three C’s of Farm Labor.’ The first ‘C’ is concentration: a vast majority of farmworkers are employed on the largest farms. The second ‘C’ is for contractors: farm labor is managed by contractors who negotiate, and profit from, the difference between what the farmer will pay to have a job done and what the workers get paid. Farmers benefit from this arrangement as it makes it difficult for worker advocates to directly negotiate and enforce wage standards, farm labor health, safety, and fair treatment regulations. To this day, it is easier for large growers to pay fines for labor and environmental abuses than follow the regulations established through the struggles of the Farm Worker Movement and allies. The third ‘C’ of California farm labor is conflict, a history of protest that continues today but that has been unable to significantly change an industry reliant on constant flows of poor migrant workers.

For the first half of the twentieth century, while considerable farmworker organizing took place, there were few public or private philanthropic efforts to address the concerns of migrant labor. This is partly due to the increasingly Mexican and Filipino labor force that both employers and the government hoped would not settle permanently in California and would instead travel with the crops and eventually return to their home countries. The anti-immigrant climate in the USA, the violent response to farm labor uprisings, and the lack of labor laws to protect farmworkers were not the only reasons that public and philanthropic attention were not directed toward the plight of farmworkers in the early decades of the twentieth century. Throughout the early 1900s, farmworker poverty was clouded by Americana imagery of the small family farm, where Anglo family members are the only visible labor. As Mitchell (1996) shows in his study of California farm labor, popular marketing and literary imagery of empty, pastoral landscapes with family working the land hid the reality of poor migrant labor camps that have existed in California since the turn of the century. While a diversity of types and sizes of farms have always existed, most farm laborers were (and still are) employed by large-scale industrial farms. It was perhaps not until 1939, when John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939) juxtaposed the radical difference between the peaceful bountiful family farm land California advertises itself as and the real lives of migrant men and families, that broad-scale national attention was drawn to the plight of the farmworker.

The Grapes of Wrath drew attention to the poor conditions and unjust treatment of California farmworkers through the story of the Jodes. The Jodes, an Oklahoma sharecropping family, had their farm repossessed during the Great Depression, and after seeing sunny advertisements about the bounty in California set out West to try their luck. The Jodes invest everything they have in the journey only to find that thousands of other families are also making the trip to the fields of the Central Valley, with the same hopes and dreams. These dreams are not so different from the Mexican migrants' myth of 'El Norte,' a vision of plentiful work and opportunity that continues to attract young men and women seeking a better life for their families. After many roadblocks and misfortunes, the Jodes arrive in California only to discover that there is an oversupply of workers, no labor rights, and that the giant farmers are in collusion to attract desperate migrant workers to live in migrant shanties and work for below poverty level wages – barely enough to keep their children clothed and fed.

Also in 1939, the now famous photos of Dorothea Lange, picturing stoic migrants and the dirt-covered faces of their towheaded children evoked similar emotions and a sense of urgency at a national scale. As Lange's photos, commissioned by the Farm Security Administration (FSA) and the Works Project Administration (WPA), were distributed to news outlets across the country, displaced Oakies farm families became icons of the era. Like *The Grapes of Wrath*, Lange's images drew attention to the strength, courage, and desperate need of the migrant worker and promoted the spirit of service and charity inspired by the WPA (Taylor, 1939). That many of the workers pictured were white mid-western share-croppers displaced during the Depression helped draw attention to a labor force that policy-makers and the general public never paid much attention. However, drawing sympathy to the individual traveling, Oakie also overshadowed the historic structural implications of a labor system that breeds poverty among a constant stream of increasingly invisible Latino and Asian farmworkers.

Lange and Steinbeck were not alone in drawing mainstream attention to the abuses of industrial agriculture and the need for farm labor organizing in 1939. This same year, Cary

McWilliams' *Factories in the Field* (1939), the first broad factual, sociological exposé of the environmental, social, and political damage inflicted by corporate agriculture in California, swept the nation. Like Steinbeck, McWilliams chronicles the suffering of the dust bowl migrants but begins with the Spanish land grants and continues on to examine the experience of the various ethnic groups that have provided labor for California's agricultural industry – Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, Filipinos – and all of the historic efforts to organize farm labor unions. In his conclusion to *Factories in the Fields*, McWilliams predicted that with an increase in white citizen workers, who may have an easier time gaining political and union recognition, farm labor organizing might finally see its day. Yet, at the start of the new decade, an increased amount of Mexican nationals were recruited to provide a constant steam of new workers and throughout the 1940s and 1950s, farmers fabricated a labor supply shortage to continue bringing in 'bracero' workers with no legal rights, a theoretically limited stay in California.

While the heroic organizing efforts of the 1930s and 1940s were ultimately unsuccessful, the public spotlight on abuses experienced by California farmworkers did attract the first glimmer of interest by private grant making foundations, as will be explored in this paper. Perhaps even greater than the attention paid to migrant farmworker poverty during the Depression, journalist Edward R. Murrow's 1960 Columbia Broadcast System documentary *Harvest of Shame* about the poverty and abuses suffered by migrant farm laborers heightened public attention to unprecedented levels. Murrow concluded his nationally viewed film with a plea to the American public:

The migrants have no lobby. Only an enlightened, aroused and perhaps angered public opinion can do anything about the migrants. The people you have seen have the strength to harvest your fruit and vegetables. They do not have the strength to influence legislation. Maybe we do. Good night, and good luck.

Among the American leaders who became committed to addressing the abuses of the farm labor system in 1960 was President John F. Kennedy. After years of struggle led by the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) and the National Farm Labor Union, and on the heels of the nationally screening of *Harvest of Shame*, Kennedy denounced the Bracero Program. The battle against the Bracero Program saw victory in 1964 and with the end of the continual importation of contracted Mexican workers a door was opened for the historic Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s.

Theorizing Philanthropy and Social Movements

Before turning to the pre-movement contributions of the Max L. Rosenberg Foundation, I discuss how my research contributes to understanding the role of private philanthropy in social movements. In the late 1970s, a small group of sociologists questioned traditional social movement theory that relied on the social psychology of citizen dissatisfaction as a rationale for explaining the rise and decline of social movement activity. Traditional social movement theory commonly argues that social movements are a response to shared dissatisfactions and a collective understanding of the causes of the problems they experience among large groups of people (Gurr, 1970; Killian, 1972; Smelser, 1963). The 'resource mobilization' scholars, many of whom studied the American social movements of the late 1950s and 1960s, argued that traditional theory fails to explain the institutional

structures, resource availability, and political constituents in place that shape the emergence, strategy, and infrastructure of social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). McCarthy and Zald in particular argue that above and beyond individual grievances and collective consciousness, ‘communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting organizational networks, and occupational structure and growth’ shape a social movement sector and climate (p. 1217).

In 1978, Piven and Cloward’s *Poor People’s Movements* (1978) took the resource mobilization argument to a new critical level by arguing that outside resources not only shape social movements but they also encourage institution building and bureaucratization that ultimately hinders significant organizing and change. In the 1980s, a new group of social movement scholars joined Piven and Cloward in critiquing resource mobilization theory as failing to recognize that outside support, such as private philanthropy, often controls and redirects radical organizing by funding moderate institutions and programs (Arnove, 1980; Garrow, 1987). Reflecting on data from activist scholars, including Allen (1969), these new studies argued that while foundations provided valuable resources to the social movements of the 1960s, heightened philanthropic interest also had clear ‘social control motives’ as foundations increasingly supported moderate organizations when urban unrest heated up between 1965 and 1968. Haines (1984) interprets this dynamic slightly differently, describing the ‘radical flank effect’ where the rising black power activists and organizations scared funders into investing in more moderate groups that otherwise would have been seen as too radical. According to Garrow (1987),

What Haines basically is arguing is a point that the sagacious Bayard Rustin articulated more briefly and more pointedly to Martin Luther King, Jr, during that long hot summer of 1967 – that intemperate, seemingly dangerous radicals do more to enhance the attractiveness of more moderate, more respectable proponents of fundamental social change to previously ambivalent or disinterested observers – including foundations officers – than anyone or anything else.

Here, philanthropic engagement in social movements can be seen as a double-edged sword where on one side foundations may control and dilute the organizing, but on the other side, ‘uncontrolled extremism will be enough to goad outside philanthropists into substantial and active support for more mainstream movement proponents of meaningful social change’ (Garrow, 1987, p. 12; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986). Jenkins (1998) takes up this framework by arguing that not only have civil rights and other ‘social movement’ funders been moderate reformers, but they have also channeled many grassroots groups into professionalized structures that rather than co-opting have benefited movements – allowing them to consolidate gains, enable larger scale mobilization and campaigns, and to protect themselves from attack. The most recent ‘philanthropy and imperialism’ literature is not as optimistic as Garrow or Jenkins, and argues that philanthropic investment in social movements is nothing less than an act of capitalist social control and cultural imperialism, disguised in moderate liberal clothing (INCITE!, 2007; Roelofs, 2003).

In this paper, I contribute to this debate by showing how philanthropic support, in keeping with resource mobilization theory, is central to the early momentum of the Farm Worker Movement. This is an especially important contribution because until recently, most scholarship on the Farm Worker Movement have focused on the emergence of the charismatic leadership of Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta, and of the right moment in

terms of national political will and structural advancements (Bruns, 2005; Levy, Jacqueline, & Fred, 2007; Shaw, 2008). While Chavez, Huerta, and the right climate were central to the movement, a strong base of farmworker serving organizations and leadership participated in the early mobilizations of the movement. A new wave of historical studies of the Farm Worker Movement trace the mass of grassroots leaders and organizations that worked alongside (and sometimes in conflict with) Chavez, sometimes through the privately and publicly funded nonprofit organizations that contributed to the early movement victories (Bardacke, 2012; Ganz, 2010; Garcia, 2012; Pawel, 2009).

In the ‘Funding the Seeds of a Movement: Resource Mobilization in California’s Central Valley’ section, I show how in the pre-movement contexts, alongside the WPA and the subsequent War on Poverty, the Max L. Rosenberg Foundation was able to align resources, build organizations, and train farmworker leaders, contributing the emergence of the movement. The rupturing of philanthropic and movement alliances, and the professionalization and subsequent diluting of organizing agendas, is alluded to at the end of this paper and explored in my broader project (Kohl-Arenas, *forthcoming*).

Funding the Seeds of a Movement: Resource Mobilization in California’s Central Valley

The particular historical convergence of WPA, The Max L. Rosenberg Foundation, and War on Poverty funding in California’s Central Valley provided a critical convergence of leadership and existing organizational resources that contributed to the initial momentum of the historic Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s. The Rosenberg Foundation invested in valley farmworker communities in three waves leading up to the movement.² The first wave included Depression era grants, mostly to support the development of community and childcare centers for migrant families and inter-ethnic education programs. The second funding era is characterized by Rosenberg’s investments in farmworker ‘self-help’ projects, aimed at assisting farmworkers in building housing and developing leadership at the same time. The third wave is the foundation’s support of early movement organizations such as Migrant Ministries and American Friend’s Service Committee’s (AFSC) Proyecto Campesino, which organized alongside Chavez and Huerta leading up to the 1965 National Farm Worker Association (NFWA – later named the United Farm Workers of America, UFW) strike.

Leslie Gaynard and the Children Who Move with the Crops

Appointed trustees of Max L. Rosenberg established the Rosenberg Foundation in 1935. Rosenberg was the president of Rosenberg Brothers & Co., the California fruit packing and shipping firm he and his brothers founded in 1893. In his will, Rosenberg, ‘left the bulk of his estate to establish a foundation with broad charitable purposes and wide latitude in how the foundation might be operated.’³ In 1936, the Rosenberg Foundation opened an office in San Francisco, hired staff, and began making grants. To this day, the foundation employs a small staff, with the Executive Director (ED) also serving as the Senior Program Officer. The first Program Officer and ED was Leslie Gaynard. When Gaynard started her work with Rosenberg in 1936, she was the only foundation program officer in California (Bay Area Foundation History, 1976). The San Francisco Foundation was not founded until 1948 with a grant from Rosenberg. Unlike the James Irvine

Foundation (also founded in the 1930s), which got into trouble after the 1969 Tax Reform Act for failing to diversify beyond family interests and report on grant making and financial activities, Rosenberg diversified early on. By expanding board membership beyond family and by selling and reinvesting company stock and assets, the foundation was the first in California to hire professional staff with the ability to design a long-term funding strategy.

In this context, Gaynard conducted her own research across the state and nation and, in consultation with her board, framed the first funding priorities of the Rosenberg Foundation. With the plight of migrant farmworkers in the spotlight in the 1930s and 1940s, federal WPA government funding was pouring into Central Valley communities to assist displaced Oakies arriving to migrant farmworker camps. According to Kirke Wilson, Rosenberg Foundation President from 1976 to 2002, Gaynard was eager to contribute to the movement to aid migrant workers.

Leslie was the first program officer West of the Rockies – an innovator who was excited to explore how Rosenberg could help the influx of migrant workers and their children in California's Central Valley. At the time there were no proposals. She drove to Bakersfield, listened to the needs of farmworker families in Kern County. She found people based on a couple previous WPA family planning grants on labor camps. The Rosenberg theory of change in the Depression area was to leverage WPA grants. For example Rosenberg would pay for materials to build parks, community centers, etc. that were initiated under the WPA. (Author Interview with Kirke Wilson, February 2008)

According to Wilson, and confirmed by Rosenberg's archived annual reports, under Gaynard's leadership (1935–1957), the foundation operated with two assumptions when funding farmworker projects. First, it was proposed that the best way to address the problems experienced in farmworker communities was to start with children. Not only did Max Rosenberg express concern for children in need through his charity during his lifetime, but focusing on children has also proven to be a more successful framework for convincing foundation boards to address the needs of immigrants and minorities. The second approach was to support the 'responsible institutions' to address the needs of migrant families. Schools, for example, served many nonEnglish speaking migrant students and experienced growing tensions between the children of immigrant farmworkers and Anglo ranchers. Toward the end of the Depression era, Gaynard convinced her board to fund childcare or educational support for farmworking women, while many farmworking men were away fighting in World War II. During this time, Rosenberg complimented WPA community planning grants and funded the founding of numerous migrant community centers and childcare programs in Fresno, Tulare, and Kern County, some of which still exist today.

As the war came to a close, Gaynard proposed that Rosenberg move away from supporting migrant women through childcare services and instead focus on the teenage children of migrant workers. In the early 1940s, Gaynard wrote a letter to public officials, local institutions, and her board of directors about the common concerns across the country for young people, minority teens, and in the Central Valley children of migrant workers. From 1937 to 1946, a majority of Central Valley grants from Rosenberg went toward inter-group relations between the increasingly Latino youth population and the

children of Anglo ranchers in the shape of school programming, community centers, and bilingual education. As framed in the 1947 Rosenberg Foundation Annual Report,

California, where only one person in three is California-born, has long been faced with the necessity of integrating its foreign-born and different nationalities into the state and community life. The 1930's added migration to the state of agricultural laborers from the Southwest [...] the first grants were for projects giving services to émigrés [...] as the years went by projects placed increasing emphasis upon integration of one group to another and breaking down of discrimination through direct action and educational methods.

As Gaynard traveled across the Central Valley, looking for allies and organizations to fund inter-group relations projects in agricultural communities, one highly influential person she met was Florence Wyckoff. Wyckoff was a life-long social activist from the Depression era through the 1970s. Her legacy includes national lobbying to maintain the FSA, the passage of the 1962 Federal Migrant Health Act, and advocacy of migrant children as a member of the Governor's Advisory Committee on Children and Youth during the 1940s and 1950s. In order to gain support and implement migrant programs at the local level, Wyckoff formed citizen groups in rural agricultural Tulare Country to address the health and education of migrant children. According to Rosenberg President (1958–1976) Ruth Chance,

Although Florence was the chairman of the committee on migrant children of the Governor's Advisory Committee on Children and Youth, she couldn't just go into Fresno County or anywhere else and do something about those children; she had to have the support of some key local people. She helped to develop a citizens' group there, which cooperated with her, some of them rather reluctantly, I think, and some with energy and conviction. (Bay Area Foundation History, 1976)

These local citizen groups and the programs they eventually formed (including a series of educational conferences for migrants, public educators, and policy-makers entitled *The Children Who Move With The Crops*) were funded by Rosenberg for almost two decades. Between 1947 and 1959, at the height of the US Mexico Bracero Guestworker Program and increased Mexican immigration, many of Rosenberg's grants went to Mexican American projects, a majority in the Central Valley. Funded projects included school-community leadership teams to build relationships between the Anglo and growing Latino communities, school curriculum development around migrant and Spanish language students, and an outdoor education program to encourage interaction between Latino and Anglo youth (Bay Area Foundation History, 1976).

Perhaps the most significant and influential Rosenberg project of the 1950s was a migrant youth education project founded by Rosenberg and the AFSC. The philosophy of the foundation at this time was not to develop their own theories of change or specific funding frameworks but to look to local innovative leaders to come up with fundable programs. The foundation operated without funding guidelines or established nonprofit institutions to make immediate grants to, enabling Gaynard to follow Wyckoff's grassroots model and work closely with local Valley officials and outsiders interested in the plight of migrant workers. One such relationship in the late 1950s was with the Quaker

Friends community in the Bay Area at the Quaker Hidden Valley Estate in Los Altos. Members of this Quaker group wanted to develop a Central Valley farmworker project. In 1955, Gaynard brought together a woman from the Bay Area Friends with a man named Bard McAllister who directed the Central Valley's AFSC office in Visalia, a small town in Tulare County. Together they asked McAllister to look for a Central Valley location to fund a farmworker project.⁴ That year, there was a lot of need in San Joaquin Valley migrant communities who were out of work due to a major flood.

The first big project that McAllister, Gaynard, and AFSC came up with together was called PSYCON and was designed to address the tensions between Anglo grower and Latino worker children in the public schools. They sold this idea to the Rosenberg Foundation Board, and McAllister recruited local farmworker leaders to facilitate educational activities and retreats for worker and grower children. The project ran in the small farmworker towns of Earlimart, Porterville, Woodlake, and Visalia and continued through the early 1960s as Central Valley schools enrollment continued to grow due to the increased Mexican migrant labor brought on by the Bracero Program. According to a review of the archived annual reports, PSYCON is the only Rosenberg funded program that went through three generations of program officers at the foundation – from Gaynard, to Chance, to Wilson. Many of the program participants played an active role in the Farm Worker Movement of the 1960s, including farmworker leaders like Pablo Espinosa who was one of the first youth trainers, who became a UFW organizer, then an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) staff person, and eventually director of another AFSC farm labor project in Visalia.⁵

Self-Help Housing: A New Approach to Community Development

In keeping with the AFSC's approach to launch new projects, see how they flourish, and let them go, McAllister left the management of PSYCON in the hands of the local schools and migrant leaders and spun off new ideas to the Rosenberg Foundation. In 1959, he brought a proposal to Rosenberg under the leadership of Ruth Chance since 1957. His new idea was to find federal housing loans that could be used for affordable farmworker housing. Chance introduced McAllister to Rosenberg Board member Charlotte Mack who agreed to privately pay his salary. A grant was made and the AFSC-founded Three-Rock Housing, which received grants from Rosenberg to train farmworkers to improve housing and community conditions in Tulare County for over two decades. A 1965, Rosenberg Foundation annual report describes the work of Three Rocks, and its successor, Self-Help Enterprise Inc.

When in 1962, the Farm Housing Act made possible long-term, low-interest loans to rural citizens who could not obtain satisfactory credit elsewhere, the Friends were quick to move. They assigned a man to Tulare County to help the agricultural workers' families learn to help themselves. For they had no collateral of the usual type to put up for loans – only their own labor [...] With encouragement of the AFSC worker groups of families began to meet together in the Goshen area. Those who had enough interest and perseverance eventually formed into groups of six or eight families who pledged to help each other build houses in their spare time and during the slack season between harvests. But first came literally months of meetings where they learned about the intricacies of obtaining building sites, the financial

obligations of home ownership, loan requirements, building design and materials, code requirements, and landscaping. (Rosenberg Foundation, 1965)

The goal of Three Rocks and Self-Help Housing Inc. only began with the financing and construction of homes. After over 20 homes were built in the first few couple years, ‘the children from these homes seemed to have better “self-images” than many other farm labor children, their motivation for education was higher [...] and their parents became more involved in community activities’ (Rosenberg Foundation, 1965). This article in the annual report describes the work of Rosenberg in Tulare County farmworker housing as a part of a new ‘community development’ approach. Inspired by the then active War on Poverty’s ‘maximum feasible participation’ programs, the central philosophy of Rosenberg’s housing grants at this time was ‘allowing people to decide for themselves what they want to do and helping them learn how to do it’ (Rosenberg Foundation, 1965). The approach is described as something new, where in the past, programs for poor people were done for them rather than with them and that this work required a new kind of social worker. McAllister is featured as a pioneer in this new community development practice:

He is a channel of communication for the fearful. His chief tool is dynamic listening. He is a professional question asker. He does not peddle answers. He seeks out realistic factors that cause apathy and is not discouraged by the seemingly endless task. In plying his trade he will never do anything for the people that they can do for themselves. He directs all of the credit for progress to the volunteer leaders, where it belongs [...] He knows that the true measure of his success lies not in what he does, but in what is done because he is there. (Rosenberg Foundation, 1965)

While Rosenberg proudly celebrated the success of its self-help funding in a 1965 annual report, it also recognized the reality of the new approach and its inherent challenges. Written the same year of the first UFW (then NFWA) strike, the 1965 annual report author recognized that while ‘Almost everybody approves if farmworkers decide to build houses for themselves; not everybody approves if they decide to go on strike’ (Rosenberg Foundation, 1965). At the same time, as many national self-help projects incubated through the War on Poverty were shut down, redirected, and co-opted after citizen groups made bold claims and demands (Citizen Crusade Against Poverty Communications, Field Foundation Archives; Katz, 1989),⁶ Rosenberg continued to support farmworker action groups engaged in the early struggles of the movement, as shown in this final section on the Rosenberg Foundation.

The Seeds of a Movement: Proyecto Campesino and Migrant Ministries

Into this cauldron [of the tumultuous 1960s] stepped a barely five foot tall critical mass of energy named Ruth Chance. She roared up and down California seeing people and organizations that were trying to respond to these challenges [...] by the mid 1960s she was in full stride as a social commentator, historian, sociologist and crusader. She persuaded her comfortable board that the Foundation should take chances on courageous, though often unproven, people [...] as a result around a

million dollars a year went to places like the San Joaquin Valley. (Gorfinkel, 2003, p. 13)

During Ruth Chance's first five years at Rosenberg, she started to build relationship with Latino organizers in the Central Valley. At the same time, as Cesar and Richard Chavez and Dolores Huerta were traveling the valley, talking to and organizing migrant workers, so were leaders funded by Rosenberg, including McAllister and a small group of farmworker leaders trained by PSYCHON and Self-Help Housing.⁷ Talking to people, they discovered and documented the many scattered communities with no water, no sewage, poor housing, and an emerging worker interest in assessing the problems and fighting for change. In 1965, with Rosenberg funding, the AFSC leaders founded Proyecto Campesino to organize and serve the poorest migrant farmworker communities in Tulare County. According to several organizers interviewed, the leadership of Proyecto Campesino and the multiple migrant projects in Tulare County were full participants in the early movement campaigns and strikes until Cesar Chavez and the emerging union tightened ranks and limited organizing strategies.

As tensions were building up to the 1965 rent and grape strikes, Chance increased funding levels to Central Valley farm labor organizing, and a number of people and projects funded by Rosenberg converged in the San Joaquin Valley town of Visalia. The AFSC PSYCHON and Self-Help Housing projects were flourishing. Kirke Wilson, then a 22-year-old volunteer, was organizing Tulare County worker coops to confront the emerging labor contractor and unfair wage systems. AFSC's Bill French, Joe Gunterman, and Isao Fujimoto joined AFSC's Central Valley Farm Committee, also funded by Rosenberg, to investigate and address local farmworker concerns.⁸ One of the projects Fujimoto directed was a training for War on Poverty Community Action Projects (CAPS) leaders on how to conduct participatory action research. Through University Extension (University of California at Davis), he conducted a series of workshops on the agricultural power structures in Tulare County and how to find public records for organizing purposes. Many of these key organizers, including Wilson, Fujimoto, and McAllister, were helping the OEO form CAPS in the Visalia area to build political participation among migrant workers. All of these organizing efforts, most of which are never mentioned in histories of the Farm Worker Movement, converged as members from each organization were involved in the 1965 UFW strike.

In the wake of the Tax Reform Act debates that began in 1965 funders concerned with the social movements of the times got a big scare.⁹ In this context, Chance believed that funding the emerging Farm Worker Movement through the church, a well-respected mainstream institution, might be the most strategic approach. Migrant Ministries, an ecumenical organization involved in organizing farmworkers alongside AFSC and the emerging NFWA (UFW), became an obvious organization to support. Leaders from Migrant Ministries such as Jim Drake and Chris Hartmeyer were key organizers in the early strikes alongside Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta.¹⁰ Chance recognized that many church people in the Valley had deep concerns about conditions for farmworkers and that funding Migrant Ministries would support the concerns of a wide array of Valley residents. In keeping with their self-help philosophy, the Migrant Ministry funding from Rosenberg had no predetermined goals. The aim was to develop leadership and for them to decide what the aims would be for the movement.

While Migrant Ministries claimed that they would never take OEO War on Poverty money that might restrict their more militant farmworker organizing (Ganz, 2008), they did accept several grants from the Rosenberg Foundation. As the World Council of Churches leadership shifted toward the social movements of the day, in 1964 Migrant Ministry committed itself to the emerging Farm Worker Movement and began a fund-raising campaign aimed at the National Council of Churches and the Rosenberg Foundation.¹¹ In 1963, Rosenberg funded Migrant Ministries to organize a Central Valley community development symposium to concretize the self-help approach, and also to train farmworker leaders for the movement (Rosenberg Foundation, 1963). Rosenberg continued to fund Migrant Ministries to train farmworker organizers through its Farm Worker–Minister project through the struggles of early 1965, even as public support withdrew from the movement in response to threats from growers. Chance recalls:

When we first went into the Migrant Ministry grants we went in jointly with local churches in Valley towns. A foundation is an outsider in the Valley, and so it is far better to join with local people or organizations so that the project has a local constituency [...] the problem arose when the local churches withdrew. Some sincere people changed their minds and some were influenced by pressures from powerful people or interests. But we had made a commitment, and the board decided that it was not going to withdraw from that commitment. Even though some churches withdrew, the Migrant Ministry continued its programs, and our grant had been made to the Ministry, as had the churches. (Bay Area Foundation History, 1976)

In the summer of 1965, the Tulare County Housing Authority radically increased rents on the tiny metal-roofed shacks where many farmworkers lived and Cesar Chavez asked Migrant Ministry to assist in a rent strike. By fall, Migrant Ministries, AFSC's Project Campesino, and leaders from the self-help projects of the 1950s and early 1960s were involved in the now famous 1965 grape-pickers strike initiated mostly by the Filipino's AWOC and led by the NFWA and Cesar Chavez. Chance conceded that the Migrant Ministry and the farmworker leaders who benefited from their grants went further than the foundation would. When Migrant Ministry staff officially joined the grape picket lines, Rosenberg told the organization that the foundation's grant was not to be used for organizing unions. Chance emphasized that the grants were meant to train leaders, but whatever the leaders did after they finished the training was their own business. The foundation continued to fund individual services and educational programs. And here is where the line was drawn for Rosenberg and the other foundations that invested in the Farm Worker Movement, as illustrated in my broader research on the private philanthropy and farmworker organizing.

Conclusion

Ultimately, in this paper and in my broader research on philanthropy, migrant poverty, and farmworker organizing, I argue that foundations do not always have articulated or clear-cut political agendas to dilute organizing campaigns. Instead, I found that moments of agreement (and antagonism) emerge and are fluidly negotiated as points of convergence appear and disappear (Laclau & Mouffe, 1982). The Farm Worker Movement gained attention from foundations partially in response to the foundations' interest in building on the poverty programming of the WPA, facilitating the national War on Poverty agenda and

inspiring a Latino wing of the Civil Rights Movement – a movement of identity and pride that complimented the civil rights and independence movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

The convergence of Farm Worker Movement leaders and funders depended on shared understandings of social positions and identities. Because leaders (actors) embody multiple subject positions, contingent upon changing political and structural contexts, they move together or against one another as the articulations and strategies of the movement unfold. While my analysis reasserts the importance of resource mobilization in social movements, especially during the fluid and open-ended beginnings, and opens up the possibility of foundations as movement allies (although fleeting and temporary), it does not deny the hard and fast lines foundation boards draw. These lines are most often drawn at the point at which a nascent organizing campaign directly confronts the economic structures upon which philanthropic wealth is created and maintained.

The ‘self-help’ approach in particular, championed by The Rosenberg Foundation, also structured a new kind of professional, the community development facilitator – a style of community worker that gained popularity domestically and eventually in participatory development projects in the global south. The programs and identities promoted through the War on Poverty CAPS and the Rosenberg Foundation grants created a new type of ‘government through community,’ ‘whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed, in novel programmes and techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity construction, personal ethics and collective allegiances’ (Rose, 1999, p. 176). These self-help and mainstream relationship building programs and frameworks, seldom mentioned in the history of the Farm Worker Movement, gave critical popular legitimacy, energy, resources, and institutional support to the emerging movement.

However, just as the self-help programs helped fuel and ignite the movement, the model also brought clearly defined limits. When the actions of the poor are structured around helping themselves attack feelings of isolation, loneliness, marginalization, and powerlessness through processes or ‘technologies of citizenship’ (Cruikshank, 1999) such as leadership development, citizenship education, and infrastructure development, attention is drawn toward the individual farmworker and away from the capitalist industrial relationships that rely on deepening global poverty. In the case of industrial agriculture, the ‘historical act of dislocation,’ as Harrington (1962) and culture of poverty scholars would describe it (or for Marx ‘original appropriation and dislocation’), that throws certain people into a ‘culture of poverty’ is not a one-time event. If this was the case, engaging farmworkers in helping themselves participate in education, leadership training, and bridge building with public institutions might be the most viable solution to farmworker poverty. However, the enduring poverty in Central Valley farmworker regions is more accurately described by ongoing processes of appropriation and dislocation – including competition and financialization in global agricultural markets – that necessitates a permanent low-wage migrant work force that comes from increasingly impoverished regions in Mexico (Holmes, 2013; Martin, 2003; Walker, 2004). Engaging farmworkers in self-help projects might help build motivation and a sense of pride, which is in many ways deeply important. However, this approach structures the actions of participants and development professionals around the fundamental and lasting conception that poverty endures through a cultural cycle of hopelessness and not a system that perpetuates and relies upon it.

From the perspective of the farmworker organizer today, decades of public and private programming have both brought necessary resources to committed advocates and governed the practices of the farmworker ‘leader,’ ‘organizer,’ and ‘expert.’ Still, these definitions

and practices are not unitary or completely controlling. Instead, they are hotly debated among farmworker organizers and advocates who challenge one another with questions such as: What is the farmworker *community* today? Who is an authentic farmworker *leader*? Which institutions are really organizing farmworkers? Reflecting upon the long history of public and private programming across the Central Valley agricultural region, some argue that modern day programs that impose ‘self-help’ or ‘civic participation’ frameworks have so closely structured the actions of institutions and participants that there is no room for building a base for a new Farm Worker Movement. Yet, amidst these troubling and weary questions, they are still organizing. And some, including Dolores Huerta, are attempting to start anew – organizing farm labor families door to door – with and without foundation funding, to build a new less professionalized base.¹²

Foundations on the other hand seldom fund worker organizing of any kind today.¹³ With the increase in undocumented immigration to California’s Central Valley the Max L. Rosenberg foundation turned away from farmworker organizing toward citizenship and immigration reform issues throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s, as did the UFW.¹⁴ However, in 2010 Rosenberg made an inaugural grant to a multi-year initiative called ‘Justice for Farmworkers’ with funds given to Oxfam, the UFW, and The National Farm Worker Ministry among others.¹⁵ Will this initiative revive farm labor organizing and help inspire a new movement? Or will it reconfirm the limits to philanthropic investments in social change?

Notes

1. Due to the space limitations of this article, the historical overview is brief and incomplete. For more information on both the history of farmworker organizing and pre-movement institutional investments, see Bardacke (2012), Ganz (2010), and Garcia (2012).
2. Data gathered on The Max L. Rosenberg Foundation funding priorities and grants include interview with past Rosenberg Foundation President, Kirke Wilson (February 2008), Rosenberg Foundation archived annual reports, confidential interviews with past grantees of the foundation, and historic farmworker organizers and advocates. (Fifty-eight interviews were conducted between September 2007 and June 2009, as part of a larger study on philanthropy and farmworker poverty. Most names were disguised to protect the identity of interview subjects.) United Farm Workers of America archives at the Walter P. Reuther Library at Wayne State University, and an oral history with past Rosenberg President, Ruth Chance, 1947–1976 (Bay Area Foundation History, 1976). Specific archival files are cited when referenced.
3. Rosenberg Foundation, <http://www.rosenfound.org>, website, accessed May–July, 2008.
4. This story was confirmed in separate interviews with former Rosenberg Foundation President Kirke Wilson (February 2008 and April 2009), and Central Valley farmworker organizer and professor emeritus at the University of California, Davis, Isao Fujimoto (April 2007 and April 2008).
5. Author Interview with Pablo Espinoza, September 2006.
6. For information on the challenges to the farmworker and activist-oriented War on Poverty programs in the Central Valley and nationally, see United Farm Worker Archives, Wayne State University, UFW Office of the President Papers, Box 63, folders 63-19 and 63-21, and *National Civic Review* article, ‘Community Sites, Talks It Over: Leadership Conference Nets Valuable Results,’ November 1966.
7. Separate author interviews with organizer and UC Davis professor emeritus Isao Fujimoto, April 2008; farmworker organizer Graciela Martinez, September 2006; former Rosenberg Foundation President Kirke Wilson, February 2008; farmworker organizer Pablo Espinoza, April 2008; and David Villarejo, November 2007.
8. Author interview with Isao Fujimoto April 2007 and April 2008.
9. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 prohibited self-dealing by foundations, regulated their grants to individuals, restricted their ownership of business, and limited their involvement in influencing legislation and participating in political campaigns. It also led to new statutory definitions distinguishing private foundations from public charities. The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 is highlighted by a series of hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee. At the time of the hearings, there was considerable

- public media attention given to foundation ‘loopholes,’ with emphasis on involvement in voter registration, grants to individuals, and connections with government agencies and officials.
10. For Migrant Ministries worker–priests program and relationship to Cesar Chavez, see United Farm Workers Archives, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, UFW Office of the President Collection, Box 68, folders 68-12, and 68-9.
 11. Migrant Ministries files from archives at Wayne State University, Walter P. Reuther Library, UFW Office of the President Collection, Box 60, folder 60-10.
 12. Author interview with Dolores Huerta, October 2007.
 13. Based on my current research (in progress), few if any funders concerned with poverty or inequality fund workers rights or holding business accountable.
 14. Rosenberg Foundation Annual Reports, 1979–1999. Online archives retrieved from <http://www.rosenbergfound.org/publications>. For information on the decline in farmworker organizing and union membership of the UFW, see recent publications by Pawel (2009) and Garcia (2012).
 15. From the Rosenberg Foundation website, visited July 9, 2013: <http://rosenbergfound.org/grants/our-grantees/fairness-in-the-fields>.

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